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Article 1

THE STRUCTURE OF TORTS
THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR.*

"Inthe particularis contained the universal." James Joyce'
ABSTRACT

Tort law consists of a number of different causes of action which are seemingly unrelated
except that all involve civil wrongs, other than mere breaches of contract. The various torts
have different elements; some, like the nominate or intentional torts, very specific; others, like
negligence, more general and vague. There is no apparent, coherent, or consistent structure
applicable to all torts. This Article articulatesjust such a unified structure for all torts: one
that arises out of and is based upon the elements of negligence. All torts involve the judicial
delineationof the defendant's duty or legal obligation.All torts require the factfinder to decide
if the defendant satisfied or breached that legal obligation. All torts involve a question of
factual cause, or cause-in-fact, and, there is always an actual, or muted, considerationof legal
cause. Finally, the factfinder considers and, if appropriate, awards damages-unless the
plaintiff seeks some alternative remedy, in which case the judge may decide the remedial
question. After articulatingthe structure, this Article applies it to a number of torts products
liability, absolute liability, defamation, and battery. Through the process of articulatingand
applying the structure, it becomes clear that there are legal questions involving the precise
scope and extent of the defendant's duty or legal obligation within all of the various elements.
This Article makes those issues plain and emphasizes that they are really questions of the
defendant's duty.
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THE LABYRINTH, THE MINOTAUR, AND TORTS

Minos was involved in a struggle with his brothers to become the
sole ruler of the Island of Crete. He prayed to Poseidon for assistance
and, sympathetically, the Sea God sent Minos a beautiful Cretan bull
to help Minos in his struggles. After successfully claiming the throne,
rather than sacrificing the bull, Minos kept it. Enraged, Poseidon
caused Minos' wife, Pasiphae, to fall in love with the bull. Their union
resulted in the birth of the minotaur, Asterion. The minotaur had the
head of a bull and the body of a human, and it ate only humans. After
consulting the oracle at Delphi, Minos had the famous architect and
inventor, Daedalus, construct a labyrinth to serve as the home of the
monster.
Later, after the accidental death of his son during a competition in
Athens, Minos attacked the Athenians. The price of peace was an
agreement that each year Athens would send fourteen young men and
women to Crete to be sacrificed to the minotaur. One year, in order to
rid the Athenians of the curse, Theseus, the son of King Aegeus, volunteered to be one of the fourteen in order to confront and kill the minotaur. With assistance from Minos' daughter, Ariadne; a ball of thread;
and his sword, Theseus slew the minotaur and escaped Crete, saving
Athens from Minos and the minotaur.2
The stories in torts, like the narratives in many Greek myths, are
compelling-the facts of the cases draw the reader into legal and human dramas. There is Mrs. Palsgraf; there are Summers and Tice;4
there are people tragically killed or injured by exposure to asbestos
and other dangerous products;5 there is the fettered mule in Davies v.
Mann;6 there are Sullivan, the ministers, and the New York Times;7
there is Larry Flynt thumbing his nose at the late Reverend Falwell.8
The stories are fabulous. In the law, they attain almost mythic proportion, like the story of Theseus defeating the minotaur. In many instances, the stories9 drive the law.
While the stories are compelling, as one digs into the law of torts,
one finds a confusing, less compelling, combination of elements and
2.

The story has more bends and tragedy than provided in this short summary. Minotaur,
[https://perma.cc/
W278-XFWF].
3. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
4. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1-2 (Cal. 1948).
5. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
6. Moseley v. Motteux (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 588.
7. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
8. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988).
9. The stories are what lawyers call the "facts."
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Minotaur
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inconsistencies. One confronts what the law student may conceive of
as a labyrinth of rules and concepts. There are nominateo torts-those
with names like assault,n battery, 12 false imprisonment,1 3 and trespass. 14 These nominate torts have what appear to be relatively precise
elements. Then, there is negligence, which provides that one must act
reasonably, and this tort has four or five rather broad elements.
Things get more complex and varied with products liability, absolute
liability for engaging in abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activities, defamation,1 6 and others. As the lawyer" steps back, she may
wonder if all the torts are related, other than merely all being civil
wrongs rather than pure breaches of contract. She may wonder if there
is a way to tie all the branches of tort law together in a more coherent
manner.
In fact, the subject of torts resembles the Cretan labyrinth with neither apparent order nor consistent analytical path. Adding to the confused nature of the subject, the role of the judge and of the jury in tort
cases is not always clear. In negligence, it is often said that the judge
decides duty and the jury decides breach, causation, and damages, but
is that accurate?18 Is there no law or role for the judge besides deciding
duty? In fact, there is a key role for the judge beyond the traditional
duty analysis because much of what the law of torts treats under the
subjects of breach, causation, and damages are actually legal matters.
These legal matters and decisions are important statements about the
scope of the defendant's legal obligation to the plaintiff. By treating
10. Nominate, BLACK'SLAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
11. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 43 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.,
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
12. Id. § 9, at 39.
13. Id. § 11, at 47.
14. Id. §§ 13-14, at 67, 85.
15. There are four elements if one considers them to be duty, breach, causation-broken
down into two sub-elements, cause-in-fact and proximate cause-and damages. There are
five if each of the causation sub-elements is treated as separate elements. Compare id. § 30,
at 164 (listing four elements of negligence, coupling cause-in-fact with proximate or legal
cause), with DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 124 (2018) (ebook) (listing five elements of negligence, with cause-in-fact and proximate or legal cause listed as independent
elements).
16. Defamation is a nominate tort; i.e., it has a name but did not arise out of the writ of
trespass, and the constitutional overlay discussed below makes it different altogether. See
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 37.2, at 938.
17. The statement in text may be particularly apt for the law student, especially the
first-year law student.
18. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 73 (1956);
see also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 37, at 235 (stating that "the court must
decide questions of law, and the jury questions of fact"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2005) ("An actor whose negligence is a factual cause of physical harm is subject to liability for any such harm within the
scope of liability, unless the court determines that the ordinary duty of reasonable care is
inapplicable." (emphasis added)). Id. § 7.
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them as issues of breach or causation or damages, the law obscures
both their true nature as law and the role of the judge in articulating
and developing that law. These questions are really part of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. A duty defines conduct or behavior that exposes someone to liability.'9 Duty also defines the scope of liability; or
in other words, it asks how far does the obligation extend and to what
types of injuries? In essence, anything that goes into formulating a
jury instruction explaining an element is law. Jury instructions are
judicial statements of law or legal obligations.
A unified, analytical structure would help to clarify the overall law
of torts-as well as make it more consistent and understandable. Is
there a structure to the law of torts that ties all torts together and that
would logically unify the subject? Is there an analytical and thematic
method of organization? To be truly helpful, such a structure would also
need to help clarify the proper role for judge and jury. Is there a metaphorical Theseus willing to kill the monstrous part of the subject?
Identifying, articulating, and applying an overall structure for and
to tort law would help it all make sense. It would help the citizenry
see, understand, and comment on this most important private law subject. After all, torts is one of those critical places in the law where society determines appropriate levels of acceptable risk. It is where deterrence, compensation, punishment, efficiency, risk spreading, and
fairness all merge to generate social policy. 20
This Article establishes that there is indeed a structure of tort law
with the power to clarify and explain the substance of the law of torts,
as well as the appropriate roles of the judge and jury. The structure is
my Theseus; it is an overarching analytical structure stretching across
all torts. The structure tames, rather than kills, the monster and provides a comprehensive, consistent basis for understanding all torts.
Such structure is based on the elements of negligence-duty, breach,
causation (actual and proximate or legal), and damages (or remedy),
and it presents a clear model for decisionmaking in torts cases. The
main analytic elements of negligence reify the basic structure of all
tort law. Thus, the structure set forth in this Article has application
to, and provides a consistent analytical approach for, all torts. For each
"separate" family of torts-intentional torts, negligence, products liability, etc.-there is a question of duty, a question of breach, a question
of causation, 2 1 and a question of damages or remedy. If the plaintiff
seeks alternative or additional relief, such as an injunction, the issue
19. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
20. See Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988); see also
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 4, at 20.
21. There is always a question of cause-in-fact; the extent to which there are questions
of legal or proximate cause may vary a bit as discussed below. See infra Part III.C-III.D.

2019]

THE STR UCTURE OF TORTS

489

would include the appropriateness of that remedy. More commonly,
though, the plaintiff seeks damages, thus this Article will focus on
damages as the fifth element of the structure of torts.
The description of the model also makes clear that while it is often
said that the judge decides duty and the jury decides breach, causation, and damages, in fact every tort, regardless of its categorization,
involves multiple questions of law. These legal questions are for the
judge to determine. The judge's legal determinations touch on each element in the structure. Many "legal" aspects of breach, causation, and
damages are actually questions or subsidiary questions of the scope of
the obligation or the scope of the duty. 22 This Article makes clear that
law is infused in every element of every tort as currently conceived and
that the law is articulated and developed by judges. 23 Critically, even
if courts articulate the applicable legal rule as part of the discussion of
breach, causation, or damages, the law is still essentially a part of the
court's definition of the extent of the defendant's legal obligation to the
plaintiff. 24
The structure of torts set forth herein makes clear that almost all
categorical decisions beyond the purely case-specific level are policy
questions for the judge. They are questions of the scope of the obligation or duty. When unveiled as legal questions, the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility between judge and jury becomes clearer and
very basic-judges articulate the law; jurors apply that law to the
facts.
In summary, this Article contends that there is a broad, overarching structure for all tort law; that structure is based on the elements
of negligence. For every tort, there is a duty issue: what is the legal
obligation owed? There is a decision about breach: did the defendant
22. For instance, whether someone is liable for medical-monitoring damages is often
analyzed as a damages issue; but in reality, it is an issue of the scope of the defendant's duty.
See, e.g., Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 3d 233, 240-42
(N.D.N.Y. 2017); see also infra Part III.E.
23. The factfinders apply the facts to the principles; they do not create the principles.
24. Thus, the structure makes clear that much of tort law is grounded in the concept of
duty or legal obligation, where duty is the basic legal question which the judge decides. The
judge decides it because it is a legal question. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Articulating and developing law is for the judge's finding of facts and whether the governing
legal standards are breached is for the jury.
Put differently, the key inquiry in any tort case is defining the obligation which one person owes to another, whether the case involves what we think of as an intentional tort, negligence, defamation, strict liability, and others. Of course, defining the obligation is a legal
question. It is, in the parlance of negligence, a question of duty. Thus, it is clear that the
judges' law-making function is triggered and pervasive throughout all of the elements of
negligence and torts in general. The Legal Realists, led by Leon Greene and Wex Malone,
taught twentieth century American tort lawyers that virtually all questions of proximate or
legal cause were really policy questions directly related to the underlying duty inquiry. As
such, legal cause decisions were policy decisions. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1033-45 (1928).
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comply with the applicable legal obligation? There is a question of causation-in-fact: did the defendant bring about a proscribed result?
There is an issue of legal causation: is it fair to hold the defendant
liable for the injury which occurred and the manner in which it occurred? And finally, there is a damages issue: what damages can the
plaintiff recover in this case? 25 In addition to supplying comprehensive
clarity, the structure makes something else clear-there is law at
every element. Many things we study or teach as issues of breach,
cause-in-fact, legal causation, or damages are really legal decisions
about the scope of the defendant's duty or legal obligation.
Section II will consider possible options for torts structures and set
forth the proposed overarching structural model, which mirrors the elements of negligence. Section III will restate the proposed structure
and explain it in the context from which it arose-negligence. Section
IV will apply the structure to products liability. Section V will show
how the structure applies to cases involving ultrahazardous and abnormally dangerous activities. Section VI will show how the structure
applies to defamation cases. Section VII will show how it also applies
to and explains defamation cases. Throughout, it will be apparent that
there are legal questions relating to the defendant's duty or obligation
to the plaintiff that arise as subparts of other elements and thereby
potentially confuse the law-or at least the allocation of decisionmaking authority. Finally, Section VIII will offer a brief conclusion.
II. CONSIDERING STRUCTURAL OPTIONS
There are multiple ways to go about articulating an organizational
or explanatory structure for torts. At the most modest level, one could
separate the nominate torts from the rest. Such an exercise is more
taxonomical and historical than anything else, and it does not move
the law forward but mires it in its roots. One could certainly argue that
the development of torts and its organization, or lack thereof, is historical. That is, at common law, most of the nominative torts grew out
of the writ of trespass, and negligence grew out of the writ of trespass
on the case. 2 6 This evolutionary view provides a possible explanation
for some of the differences we see in torts, and some might be satisfied
to conclude that legal habits styled in the Middle Ages simply stuck.
One accepting this historical explanation might shrug off further organizational effort to explain torts on some structural basis. Under
this historical view, torts that did not arise out of the alluvial soils of

25. More broadly, one might ask what remedy is appropriate in this case, as plaintiffs
in tort cases sometimes seek injunctive relief in the form of restitution, but damages are far
more common.
26. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 6, at 28-29. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the common law represent societal responses to changing circumstances and new needs-even if they all but developed free from any
torts metastructure. 27 Courts may create new torts in response to
twentieth or twenty-first century policy needs, but in doing so they
contribute to torts' seemingly incoherent complexity. The problem
with the historical view of torts is that first, it largely ignores the
civil law's influence or approach to torts; and second, it does not provide a coherent organizational structure for a most important area of
private law.
Alternatively, one could offer a "big" theory, like efficiency for the
legal economists; 2 8 strict liability based on history and cause; 2 9 feminism;3 0 communitarianism;3 1 or risk spreading.3 2 While these are useful and even brilliant theories, they are theories. They are not analytical or organizational structures.33 These theories purport to explain
or justify results. They are also normative and push courts in theoretically result-oriented directions. For instance, law and economics
scholars urge courts to reach conclusions that foster economic efficiency.3 4 A feminist scholar might explain results in cases based on societal discrimination against women and justly urge courts to take
feminist perspectives into account when deciding cases.35 A communitarian might urge the adoption of community values.3 6 The risk
spreader would impose liability or responsibility on the cheapest cost
27. The reins on unlimited growth is the nature of the common law process and the
policies supposedly underlying all of tort law: deterrence of undesirable conduct, avoiding
overdeterrence of socially desirable activity, compensation, risk spreading, society's sense of
fairness, deference to legislative will, and a healthy respect for precedent. See supra note 19
and accompanying text.
28. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757, 763-64
(1975) ("[T]he legal system itself ...
has been strongly influenced by a concern . . . with
promoting economic efficiency."); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 7 (3d ed. 2003).
29. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
30. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
(1999).
31. See generally Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where
Rights Meet Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649 (1995).
32. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Mark A. Geistfeld, Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts:
CarryingCalabresiFurther, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2014).
33. Certainly, some of these theories offer clear guides for decisionmaking. Posner urges
decisions based on economic efficiency. Posner, supra note 28. Epstein urges a return to a
type of trespass based strict liability. Epstein, supra note 29. In that regard, they counsel
how to decide. What I am striving to do is focus on what is being decided and how it involves
a judge articulating law rather than how she should decide.
34. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
35. C.f CHAMALLAS, supra note 30, at 171-73.
36. See Ackerman, supra note 31, at 683-84.
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avoider or the one best able to spread the risk across a broader group.3 7
The structure described herein is not normative. It does not push results in any particular direction; instead, it provides a comprehensive
model for the steps involved in deciding tort cases of all types and for
who makes which decisions at which step. It seeks to clarify and explain the process of decisionmaking, not the result.
The proposed model articulates what is common to all tort claims,
and it sets forth a unifying structure. The goal is to identify one structure that fits all torts. A good place to begin is the modern civil law of
torts. The next subsection will briefly describe the civil law approach
to torts. The civil law is comprehensive and systematic. The model exemplifies those traits while also building upon and incorporating the
common law of torts.
A.

The Civil Law of Torts

It is an initial principle of the civil law that today's civil law judge
or scholar looks first to the civil code when dealing with private law;
she does not consult the cases first but the Code itself.38 The most recent version of the French Civil Code, in its general articles on torts or
d6lits,3 9 provides in part:
Art. 1240. - Any human action whatsoever which causes harm to
another creates an obligation in the person by whose fault it occurred to make reparation for it.
Art. 1241. - Everyone is liable for harm which he has caused not
only by his action, but also by his failure to act or his lack of care. 4 0
Article 1240 provides a broad statement of the legal obligation 4 1 not to
injure another. 4 2 Everyone who is at fault and causes injury must repair
37. See Calabresi,supra note 32, at 517-19.
38. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (1998) ("The sources of law are legislation and custom.").
See also id. cmt. b (stating that jurisprudence is a secondary source of law).
39. The French translation for torts is d6lits. GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO, ONTARIO
ENGLISH-FRENCH LEGAL LEXICON 263 (1987).
40. JOHN CARTWRIGHT ET AL., THE LAW OF CONTRACT, THE GENERAL REGIME OF
OBLIGATIONS,

AND PROOF OF OBLIGATIONS 27 (2016), http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/

art-pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZP2-U3ZC]. The Louisiana Civil Code has a similarly broad article. Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, derived
from the 1804 version of the Code Napoleon authored, also states in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315(A) (2001).
41. Of course, the French and civil law of contracts is called obligations. SAUL
LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS § 1.1, at 1 (2d ed.
2001). Tort law "obligations" are still obligations in the colloquial sense, but they are not
voluntarily entered into as are contracts. See generally Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249
So. 2d 133 (La. 1971); P. Olivier & Sons, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Lake Charles Harbor and
Terminal Dist., 160 So. 419 (La. 1935).
42. It is true that the French Civil Code currently has a number of articles after the
general statement of liability for fault, which are more specific. CARTWRIGHT ET AL., supra
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it. Article 1241 makes clear that negligence or the lack of care is a type
of fault.43
The late Tulane torts professor and scholar, Ferdinand Stone, wrote
that the civil law of torts had three core elements: fault, cause, and damage. 4 4 But the three concepts of fault, cause, and damage provide a rather stark skeleton upon which to build a comprehensive torts structure.
Fault, cause, and damage do not, standing alone, adequately take account of and encapsulate all the elements of all American torts. Nor do
the words fault, cause, and damage provide sufficient specificity or direction to American lawyers and judges who would wonder exactly what
fault means and what type of causation is required. Damages are somewhat less troublesome, but Professor Stone's basic model also fails to
adequately explain who decides what.
B. Moving Towards a More Detailed Structure: Negligence
Something slightly more detailed and perhaps more robust than
Professor Stone's civil law three-headed model is desirable and possible. The model proposed herein combines the simple elegance of
Stone's model and practically links his civil law model with the American, common law tradition. The model is comprehensive, like the civil
law, and, simultaneously, works from and adopts a structure with
which American jurisprudence is already familiar. In doing so, it practically explains who-between judge and jury-ought to be deciding
what.
The most descriptive, prescriptive, and familiar structure for all of
torts is the analytical structure for negligence. Negligence consists of
four or five elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. Negligence consists of four elements if we say that causation has two subelements: cause-in-fact and legal cause. Negligence consists of five el-

note 40, at 27 (articles 1241-1244). In that regard, the Code tends, in a way, to mirror the
common law with its separate categories of tort liability. Louisiana follows suit. However,
the initial overarching article and its message-one at fault who causes damages is liable to
fix it-provides one big principal from which the more specific articles follow. LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. arts. 2315-2324.2 (2018). In that way, it seems to provide the beginning of some universal structure for analysis of torts cases.
43. Suzanne Galand-Carval, Fault Under French Law, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW:
FAULT 89 (Pierre Widmer ed., 2005); Olivier Mor6teau, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a
French Perspective, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
59, 72 (Helmut Koziol ed., 2015); DALLOZ, RtFORME DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS: UN
SUPPLEMENT AU CODE CIVIL 2016, at 30 (2016) ("Le sous-titre II intitul6 << La responsabilit6

extracontractuelle ) reproduit in extenso des articles 1382 A 1386-18 du code civil . . . ." This
means that art. 1240 is identical to old art. 1382 and 1241 identical to old 1383).
44. FERDINAND F. STONE, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT DOCTRINE § 10, at
19 (1977). See also Andr6 Tunc, A Codified Law of Tort-The French Experience, 39 LA. L.
REV. 1051, 1056 (1979) ("No less remarkable is the fact that the common law has never formulated a general principle of civil liability.").
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ements if we say that cause-in-fact and legal cause are not sub-elements, but rather that they stand alone. The model will present them
separately but will note that for some torts, such as the intentional
torts and defamation, the legal cause element may not always be express. Negligence is the most common of all torts.4 5 In addition, other
areas of tort law incorporate or build upon negligence concepts-examples include products liability (particularly design and warning
cases), 4 6 defamation cases involving private party plaintiffs suing over
speech which is a matter of public concern, negligent misrepresentation, 47 and, naturally, the employer's vicarious liability for negligent
acts of employees. 4 8 Thus, it is both a convenient and familiar foundation upon which to build the structure of torts.
It is also a sound foundation upon which to build because all torts
can be broken down into duty, breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, and
damage. The most important element is duty because duty is the element or place at which the court sets forth and defines the relevant
legal obligation. Thus, the definition and scope of the duty or legal obligation owed is a legal question for the court to decide whether a duty
is owed to the plaintiff.49 Breach asks whether the defendant complied
with his legal obligation. 0 Breach is a question of applying the articulated obligation to the facts of the case." It is a mixed question of fact
and law for the jury or judge as factfinder.5 2 Cause-in-fact involves factual causation: did the defendant's breach of duty (the legal obligation)
factually cause the plaintiffs injuries?5 3 Most commonly, the issue is
45. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, § 9.1, at 187 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DOBBS
ET AL., HORNBOOK] ("Negligence claims represent the great majority of tort claims presented,
brought, or tried today.").
46. See, e.g., Louisiana Products Liability Act, LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-2800.59
(2009); see also id. § 9:2800.56 (unreasonably dangerous design claims); id. § 9:2800.57 (inadequate warning claims).
47. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 107, at 745 ("[M]isrepresentation frequently
occurs in ordinary negligence actions .. . and the courts have not found it necessary to distinguish it in any way from any other negligence.").
48. Id. § 69, at 499 ("[Vicarious liability] is still an action for negligence, and the ordinary rules of negligence liability are still applied to it.").
49. More precisely, we might say the issue is whether the defendant owes a duty to the
class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs for the type of injury which occurred. Thus,
some courts decide the scope of liability or duty as a matter of law. The general discussion of
the propriety of that duty/risk approach is beyond the scope of this piece. See Dixie Drive It
Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 137 So. 2d 298, 304 (La. 1962).
50. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 10.2, at 206 ("[D]uty is whether the defendant is under an obligation to use care to avoid injury to others. Breach, in contrast, is
whether the defendant did in fact use appropriate care.").
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328(B)-328(C) (Am. LAW INST. 1965); id. § 328(C)
cmt. b ("I]t is the function of the jury to apply to the facts in evidence the standard of conduct
required by the law in the performance of the defendant' s legal duty.").
52. Id. §§ 328(B)-328(C). And assuming of course that reasonable minds could differ.
53. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 183.
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whether it is more probable than not that but-for the defendant's alleged tort the plaintiff would not have suffered the injuries for which
she seeks recovery.5 4 Legal cause is a more intuitive inquiry where one
decides whether it is fair, under the particular facts of the case, to hold
the defendant responsible for the particular injuries the plaintiff suffered as a result of the defendant's breach of his legal obligation." Because the legal cause question asks whether it is fair under the particular facts of the particular case to hold the defendant responsible, the
factfinder usually decides legal cause after receiving proper instructions on the law or duty from the judge. 6
Inevitably, because fairness and justice are related to the policies
judges consider when deciding whether to impose a duty, there can be
some understandable overlap between the duty question and the legal
cause question. This overlap is most helpfully avoided by making duty
a question of what the rule generally ought to be for similar types of
cases 57 and limiting the legal cause question to the peculiar facts of the
particular case. The duty question should be broad and apply to classes
of plaintiffs and classes of injuries; it should not be case specific. Legal
cause asks whether on these particular facts the defendant, whose
breach of a legal obligation factually caused injuries to the plaintiff,
should be liable. It asks: is it too unfair, unjust, or bizarre to hold the
defendant liable in this particular case? The particularized nature of
the question-tailored to the very case before the court and not some
other case-makes it appropriate for the factfinder to determine legal
cause. In some cases, particularly intentional tort cases, there may not
be a discussion of legal cause because the court might essentially decide legal cause in intentional tort cases as a matter of law based on
the policy of punishing the intentional wrongdoer and the tendency to
extend the scope of responsibility. But the legal cause issue is there,
albeit behind the scenes.5 8

Before applying the structure, it is important to note that aspects of
modern tort law are befogged, if not deceptive, because matters that are

54. Id. § 14.4, at 317.
55. See Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W.2d 252, 256 n.6 (Tenn. 1997) ("Proximate or legal cause is a policy decision made by the legislature or the courts to deny liability for
otherwise actionable conduct based on considerations of logic, common sense, policy, precedent
and 'our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands . . . .' " (emphasis
added) (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1997))); see also PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 11, § 41, at 263.
56. PROSSER AND KEETON, supranote 11, § 45, at 321 ("[I]f reasonable persons could differ.
the issue of 'proximate cause' is submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions on the
law.").
57. I.e., negligent infliction of emotional distress, cases involving the failure to act,
cases involving unborn plaintiffs, etc.
58. See infra Part VII.
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actually questions of legal obligation are lurking in the other elements. 9
Authors organize their torts casebooks in this confusing fashion;60 lawyers then organize their thinking the same way authors organize torts
casebooks. Torts teachers confuse our students and the waters become
muddy. Recognizing the reality that many issues we analyze as part of
breach, cause-in-fact, legal cause, or damages are really legal questions
about the scope of the defendant's duty clarifies who ought to be deciding what.61
For instance, when we talk about breach, we say one breaches her
duty to another when she does not act reasonably. Of course, the "duty
to act reasonably" is a statement of duty. It is not a breach question.
Whether there is a breach depends on a comparison of the facts to common sense notions of what is reasonable, but the duty is to use reasonable care. However, most torts books 62 treat the obligation to exercise
reasonable care in chapters named "standard of care" or "negligence."1
The name of the chapter is not "duty." Indeed, the obligation to exercise reasonable care is perhaps the most basic of all statements of duty.
This is not mere semantics because it is the judge who decides or articulates duty and the jury who decides breach. Keeping their roles
separate is essential. The next Section will articulate the model in the
context in which it arose-negligence.

III.

RESTATING AND AFFIRMING THE STRUCTURE BEFORE APPLYING IT

A.

Duty

Duty is a crucial and, as just noted, sometimes confusing element.
It is also the most important. It is where the legal action is and, as
noted, oft times things that are categorized questions of breach, causation, or damageS 63 are really questions about the existence or extent
of the defendant's legal obligation or duty. They are legal questions

59. See infra Part III.
60. See, e.g., FRANK L. MARAIST ET AL., TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA
PERSPECTIVES i-vii (3d rev. ed. 2017). I am a responsible co-author of this casebook. Mea
culpa.
61.

WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, TORT LAW

§ 4.2

(2d ed.

2009) ("Questions of law are for the court; questions of fact are for the jury."). See also infra
Part III. Another way to say it is that anything in a jury instruction that explains an element
(or the law relating to an element) is a legal decision that the court has made. And as such,
it is a judicial statement about the legal obligation that the defendant owes.
62. ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND
PROBLEMS 91-93 (2003); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 143-45 (8th

ed. 2004); MARAIST ET AL., supra note 60, at ii; VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE
AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 129-30 (10th ed. 2000); AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON,
JR., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 109-10 (2003).
63. See infra Part III.B-E.
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and when courts decide them, judges are making law. They are deciding upon the legal obligation or scope of the duty. Duty is thus a much
more complex and wider ranging topic than currently suggested in our
organization of the law of torts. 6 4
What then does it mean to say a person has a duty? The conclusion
that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff is a recognition or statement of a legal obligation one person, the defendant, owes to another
person, the plaintiff. At its most basic, with negligence, a defendant
has a legal obligation to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances. 6 Why? Because society has determined this, based
on morality, ethics, deterrence, the desire to compensate the injured,
and more that people should not expose others to an unreasonable risk
of harm. The societal actor who made this determination is the court.
The first judge who uttered the statement that a person had a duty to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent risk to
another made a monumental legal statement about responsibility.66
Importantly, if obviously, the court articulates the obligation-reasonable care under the circumstances. Perhaps because it is generally
such an obvious statement, one sometimes forgets that it is a basic rule
of law; but the duty to exercise reasonable care is the most basic duty
or law in negligence.
How much care must the defendant sued for negligence exercise?
Reasonable care under the circumstances. He or she must behave as a
reasonable person of common or ordinary prudence. 67 Of course, there
is no such person; 68 it is a legal hypothetical-a guideline for the factfinder. Whether the defendant has broken or breached that duty requires an analysis of the surrounding circumstances, which is a very
focused, fact specific inquiry. That is why the factfinder makes the
breach determination. The fact-based determination of breach is
64. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 125, (explaining the current, more narrow discussion of the duty element).
65. See, e.g., Hocking v. Dodgeville, 768 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 2009); see also DOBBS ET AL.,
supra note 445, § 10.5, at 213 (" [T]he standard of conduct to which the defendant must conform is typically the standard of a reasonable person under the circumstances .... ). Similarly, one might say that the duty to comply with a contract to which one is a party is a
statement of legal obligation. The contract (and applicable law) define the obligation for the
particular case. The factfinder decides whether the parties have complied with their legal
obligations. Hometown Fin., Inc. v. U.S., 409 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
66. A search in LexisNexis reveals that the first reported American decision in which
the phrase is used is Masterton u. Village of Mount Vernon, 58 N.Y. 391, 394 (1874). For an
early statement of the "prudent" person standard, which is substantially similar, see
Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492.
67. Masterton, 58 N.Y. 391; Vaughan (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490; see also PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 174.
68. A. P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAw 1-2 (7th ed. 1952). See also LOuIS R.
FRUMER & MELVIN 1. FRIEDMAN,
21
PERSONAL INJURY-ACTIONS,
DEFENSES,
DAMAGES § 101.01(2)(b) (2019).
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whether the defendant has violated the legal standard of reasonable
care, which the court has delineated.69
Legally, the duty owed may change for certain people; let us call
them atypical people even though in doing so we recognize no one is
typical.7 0 For instance, the law takes account of physical differences in
articulating and applying the duty to exercise reasonable care. The vision-impaired or blind person is not typical, but the law does not say:
"The reasonable (typical) person is not blind so the vision-impaired
person must act as a reasonable person who is not vision-impaired."
Instead, the law provides that the vision-impaired person is held to the
standard of care of the reasonable person who is vision-impaired."
That is a statement of law; it is a statement of the vision-impaired
person's legal obligation; it is a statement of duty. A jury is neither free
to disregard it nor decide that in a particular case it will hold a visionimpaired person to the standard of care of a reasonable person who
can see. Why does the law provide for that standard of care or duty?
Because an alternative rule, holding the vision-impaired person to the
standard of care of the person who can see, would arguably confine risk
averse vision-impaired people to their homes.7 2 They would be scared
to go out or they would have to always be accompanied by another,
which would be expensive and potentially demeaning and offensive. At
the same time, holding the vision-impaired person to the standard of
a reasonable person who is vision-impaired is a determination that allowing vision-impaired individuals to more fully participate in society
is worth the arguably slightly increased risk they may pose to others.
These are policy matters appropriately addressed to the court, and
when the court resolves them, it does so for all vision-impaired persons, not just the one before the court.
Of course, the duty of the vision-impaired person to behave as a
reasonable person who is vision-impaired has its limits. Vision-impaired people are not permitted to drive cars; they would pose too great
69. At the end of the day, a factfinder's decision that there has been a breach does not
constitute law; it constitutes the application of law (the duty to exercise reasonable care) to
a particular case.
70. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 129.
71. Another way to say the same thing is to ask, what circumstances does the law mandate be taken into account when deciding what obligation is owed to others? See id. § 10.9,
at 223 ("[O]ne with physical illness or other physical disability is held to the standard of a
reasonable person having such a disability, not to a standard of some ideal or average physical capacity."); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 175 ("As to his physical characteristics, the reasonable person may be said to be identical with the actor.").
72. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 175-76 ("The person who is blind ...
is entitled to live in the world and to have allowance made by others for his disability, and
the person cannot be required to do the impossible by conforming to physical standards
which he cannot meet." (footnotes omitted)); DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 10.9,
at 224 (" [A]n unsighted person is not to be considered negligent merely by going out into the
world.").
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a risk if they did so.7 3 But if a vision-impaired person is driving a car
and has an accident, the law holds him to the standard of care of the
reasonable person, not the reasonable person who is vision-impaired
and driving.74 That too is a statement of duty or law. It is a modification of the rights of vision-impaired persons with the risks that their
engaging in a dangerous behavior like driving would cause to them
and others. A factfinder is not free to ignore that rule in a particular
case. Again, the important point is the articulation of the standard of
care is a statement of duty, law, and legal obligation.
Another example involves children. In negligence cases, the law
does not hold the child to the standard of care of a reasonably prudent
person under the circumstances. Instead, it holds the child to the
standard of care of a child of like age, intelligence, and experiencethat is a statement of the duty or legal obligation the child owes.7 5 The
child standard of care recognizes that children cannot be expected to
function as reasonably and logically as adults.7 6 It is also a recognition
of the fact that children need to grow and mature, and for them to grow
and mature they must be allowed to participate in the life of the community." Finally, every one of us was once a child, so there is an experiential and intuitive understanding of the growth process.
In some ways, the child standard of care ignores the supposedly objective reasonable person standard while at the same time it somewhat
incorporates it. For instance, the standard is not the reasonable eightyear-old or ten-year-old but the reasonable child (like the defendant)
of like age, intelligence, and experience. The child standard is perilously close to being subjective, but it uses the word reasonable. Nevertheless, it is a legal recognition that children do not grow and mature
at the same rate, so age itself can be misleading. The creation of the
child standard of care was a policy decision applicable to all children,
and, as such, it was a legal decision, properly made by judges. The
factfinder determines if the child complied; the factfinder does not decide the legal standard.
Not unlike the vision-impaired person, there are limits to the tailored standard of care for children. If a child engages in an adult activ-

73. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, §10.9, at 224-25 ("To the extent that a
reasonable person with similar limitations would do so, a disabled person must adjust for
limitations by using other senses or by altering conduct to minimize the risks created by the
disability.... A person with failing vision may be expected... to avoid altogether an activity
like driving . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
74. See id.
75. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 134.
76. Id.
77. See id.
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ity, the law holds her to the standard of care of a reasonable adult under the circumstances. 7 8 The ten-year-old stepping away from a car accident in which she was driving does not exculpate herself by saying:
"I did okay for a ten-year-old of my abilities." A child engaging in an
adult activity loses the protection of the standard of care for children.
The law decides that although it can tolerate some extra risk associated with growing children, it cannot tolerate that risk when the activity in which the child is engaging is an adult activity. Typically,
adult activities are more dangerous to others than children's activities.
The decision to hold the child engaged in a dangerous activity to the
adult standard of care is a legal one. Naturally, some jurisdictions may
consider something an adult activity and another may consider it a
childhood activity;79 but that difference is merely the result of different
community values in different jurisdictions. In such cases, it is accurate to say that the law is different in those jurisdictions.
Likewise, the court articulates duty in professional negligence
cases differently than "reasonable care under the circumstances." For
instance, in medical malpractice cases the law does not mandate that
a doctor must exercise the level of care of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances. Imagine a layperson performing heart
surgery exiting the operating room and happily proclaiming: "God
knows whether he'll live or not, but I did a darn good job for someone
who has no medical training." Instead, the law holds the doctor to the
standard of care of the reasonable doctor either in the same or similar8 0 locality or, in the case of specialists, in the nation (which is the
rule in a case involving a heart surgeon).81 Again, this is a legal statement of duty-the legal obligation owed. The factfinder cannot ignore
it and decide that a trained doctor did as well or better than a reasonable person who was not a doctor so she should not be negligent.
In deciding whether to hold the doctor to the standard of care of a
doctor in the same locality or a similar locality or to a national standard, the court is also making a legal determination-it is deciding the
scope of the legal obligation for that jurisdiction. Of course, different
78. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 181 ("[W]henever a child, whether as
plaintiff or as defendant, engages in an activity which is normally one for adults only, such
as driving an automobile or flying an airplane, the public interest and the public safety require that any consequences due to the child's own incapacity shall fall upon him rather than
the innocent victim, and that the child must be held to the adult standard, without any allowance for his age." (citations omitted)).
79. Compare Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Westchester Cty. Ct. 1968)
(holding an 11-year-old golfer who hit plaintiff with a golf ball to the adult standard of care),
with Hudson-Connor v. Putney, 86 P.3d 106, 111 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that entrustment and operation of a golf cart are not considered "adult activit[ies]").
80. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 187-88, 188 nn.46-47.
81. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 537 (Utah 1981); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note
11, § 32, at 188, 188 n.48.
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types of doctors may be held to different standards in the same jurisdiction. 8 2 That too is law. It is not something factfinders are free to
ignore as they choose. 83 We could undertake a similar analysis for all
other professionals. 8 4
People engaged in certain other occupations are often said to owe
higher duties of care or utmost care to protect others. The law purportedly holds them to a stricter standard than reasonable care under the circumstances. Some examples include common carriers who
owe a duty of "utmost" care to their passengers8 5 or innkeepers who
also owe a "high" duty of care to their guests.8 6 Some of the reasons
for these heightened duties are no doubt historical. 87 One intuits that
the same results might be reached in most cases involving common
carriers and innkeepers by holding the common carrier or innkeeper
to a standard of reasonable care of a similarly situated individual,
noting the particular dependency of the passenger upon the common
carrier and the guest upon the innkeeper as important circumstances
in determining breach. Be that as it may, the higher standards of
care applicable to these certain defendants are rules of law. They are
an articulation of the legal obligation owed; a factfinder assesses the
particular facts against that standard, but the factfinder is not free
to ignore it. The statement that a common carrier or innkeeper owes
passengers and guests a heightened duty of care is a statement of the
defendants' duties.
There are also instances where the law may lower the standard of
care. The most noteworthy example is the "emergency doctrine."8 8 This
doctrine provides that a person confronted with an emergency, not of
their own making, does not have to exercise the level of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in a non-emergency situation.8 9 She
must only exercise that level of care that a reasonable person would
82. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 188, 188 n.48 (comparing a general practitioner to a specialist).
83. And the standard of care in most cases requires the plaintiff to present expert testimony. While one might say that is a rule of evidence, it also goes to the legal standard. The
professional is held to the standard of care of a reasonable member of that profession, and
the law requires expert testimony to articulate that standard. See, e.g., Hassebrock v. Bernhoft, 815 F.3d 334, 341-42 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying Illinois law).
84. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 32, at 185-86 ("Most of the decided cases
have dealt with surgeons and other doctors, but the same is undoubtedly true of dentists,
pharmacists, psychiatrists, veterinarians, lawyers, architects and engineers, accountants,
abstractors of title, and many other professions and skilled trades." (footnotes omitted)).
85. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (West 2019).
86. E.g., Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 428, 434-35 (Va. 2006).
87.

See LOuIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN

1.

FRIEDMAN, 7 PERSONAL INJURY-ACTIONS,

DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 23.03(2)(a) (2019); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
cmts B & C (AM. LAw INST. 1965).
88. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 33, at 196-97.
89. Id.

§ 314(A)
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exercise in an emergency.9 0 From a policy perspective, the emergency
doctrine is a recognition that people (reasonable people) do not always
think as clearly in an emergency. Once articulated by the courts as a
matter of first impression, the doctrine is a rule of the legal obligation-a duty rule. Of course, one might wonder whether the emergency
is really just one of the circumstances the reasonable person sometimes encounters and there is no need to separately mention it; but
many courts do, and when they do, the emergency becomes part of the
law which factfinders must follow in deciding individual cases.
To sum up the previous few paragraphs, within the general duty to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in negligence cases
there can be additional, more focused legal statements of the defendant's legal obligation. These legal "rules" are judicial recognitions that
balancing of rights and risks justifies the alteration of the duty of reasonable care in certain relatively broad types of cases. While reasonable care is always determined in light of foreseeable risks, policies relating to accommodation, expertise, deterrence, or psychological reality (in the case of children and emergencies) lead to refinements of the
general duty to exercise reasonable care. There are other cases where
even though the defendant's conduct posed a foreseeable risk of harm,
other policies and historical considerations led courts to alter or limit
the duty owed.
Historically, there were several significant fact situations where
the court did not impose a duty to exercise reasonable care upon a defendant, even though the defendant's conduct posed a foreseeable risk
of harm to others. Today it is more common in these situations for the
court to conclude that a duty is, or may be, owed, but the court will
couch the duty with conditions; the court will not simply recognize a
general duty to exercise reasonable care. The torts luminary, Dean
William L. Prosser, called these situations: "Limited Duties." To
name a few, at common law, a defendant had no duty to affirmatively
act to help another person; 9 2 a defendant formerly had no duty to exercise reasonable care to protect against negligently inflicted emotional distress; 93 a defendant had no duty to protect against third party
criminal misconduct; 94 and there were and are more.95 All of these old

90.
91.
al. eds.,
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
WILLIAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 324-27 (Jesse H. Choper et
4th ed. 1971).
DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 25.1, at 615.
Id. § 29.9, at 713.
See id. § 26.1, at 633-34.
See generally id. §§ 25-26.
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rules were based upon policy analyses prevalent at the time courts articulated them. A no-duty rule, as much as a rule recognizing a duty,
is a statement about the legal obligation or lack thereof.
Interestingly, the exceptions to those old no-duty rules that courts
have developed fit this Article's structural model. For instance, as
noted, at common law there was no duty to act to help another. Courts
(and legislatures) 9 6 have eroded the rule, but they have not done so
across the board.97 Instead, they have created exceptions to the noduty-to-act rule. One exception provides that there is a duty to act if
there is a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff.9 8 For instance, a parent has a duty to act to help his or her minor
child.99 Stated affirmatively, there is a duty to act to help another if
the defendant has a special relationship with the person in need of aid.
The duty statement recognizes the existence of a legal obligation. Critically, in order to trigger the duty in a particular case, there is an underlying factual question that needs to be answered: was there a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff? That factual
question is for the jury, but the statement that one with a special relationship to the victim must act to aid the victim is a legal statement
from the court-it is law.
Additionally, determining which relationships the law considers
special and duty triggering are legal questions. Under the analytical
approach proposed herein, making those decisions is for the court.
Likewise, under my structural analysis/proposal if reasonable minds
could differ on whether the duty triggering special relationship exists
in a particular case is for the jury-it is purely a question of fact.
Similarly, some jurisdictions have held that there is no duty to
protect against third party criminal acts. 00 However, there may be a
duty, under one test, if the criminal act that occurred was substantially similar to criminal acts which had occurred in the past.101 This
statement of duty is a statement about the existence of a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care. And again, there is a factual issue-were the crimes substantially similar? Just how substantially
similar those prior crimes must be to trigger a duty, however, is a

96.

E.g., Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 316-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); MINN.

§ 604A.01(1) (2018).
97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
at 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
STAT.

FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 37,

98. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 415.
99. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 25.4, at 621 ("The relationship of a parent to a minor child likewise almost certainly imposes an affirmative duty upon the parent
to use reasonable care to rescue the child from a known danger.").
100. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 416.
101. Id.
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legal question. Once the relevant court1 0 2 determines the applicable
test for substantial similarity, and reasonable minds could differ, the
substantial similarity of the crimes at issue to the prior crimes is a
fact question.1 03
Sometimes the plaintiff relies upon the violation of a statute to establish the standard of care. If the court accepts the statute as the
standard of reasonable care under the circumstances-a duty decision-then the statute sets forth the legal obligation. 10 4 The court decides whether to adopt a statute as the standard of care of the reasonable person under the circumstances. It does so by asking whether the
plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the legislature enacted the
statute to protect 1 and whether the risk is one of the risks legislature
enacted the statute to guard against. 106 The answers to those questions
are matters of law for the judge to decide.1 0 7
The decision of whether or not a duty exists is a decision about the
legal existence of an obligation to exercise reasonable care. It is a question of law, and thus it is for the court to decide. Of course, whether a
duty ultimately exists in a particular case may depend upon the resolution of underlying factual issues-in other words, was there a special
relationship between the defendant and plaintiff? Were the crimes
substantially similar? Did the defendant commit affirmative acts? But
the duty statement is a statement of law. Different courts have analyzed the duty issue with more or less factual specificity, and that fact
102. Probably an appellate court.
103. Other courts, like the Louisiana Supreme Court in Posecaiu. Wal-Mart Stores, 752
So. 2d 762, 768 (La. 1999), impose a duty to protect against criminal misconduct if the burden
of preventing the crime is less than the probability of the crime occurring times the anticipated loss if the crime does occur. While the court's conclusion in any particular case is a
statement of a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care or the lack thereof and so fits the
structural model, the nature of the test poses the intellectual and structural risk that the
judge in deciding duty will potentially overlap the jury function in deciding breach, but I am
getting ahead of myself.
104. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, §§ 148-58. The analysis in the text is somewhat oversimplified because it ignores the fact that the procedural effect of violating a statute in a
negligence case may be: negligence per se (in which case the statute adopted as the standard
of care in the negligence case sets forth the duty or legal obligation and the defendant is
negligent unless he establishes a judicially recognized excuse); a presumption of negligence
(in which case the statute adopted as the standard of care in the negligence case sets forth
the duty or legal obligation and the defendant is negligent unless he establishes that despite
the statutory violation he exercised reasonable care under the circumstances); or some evidence of negligence (in which case the violation does not necessarily establish the standard
of care but is some evidence of it for the jury to consider and the plaintiff maintains the
burden of proof).
105. Id. § 153.
106. Id. § 152.
107. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 13.1, at 292 ("Judges rather than juries
determine whether the defendant was under a duty of care at all and if so what standard of
care applied. . . . If the judge determines that the defendant owed a duty of care, the judge
will instruct the jury as to the proper standard.").
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has fueled substantial debate,108 but it is beyond the discussion here.
After the court articulates the applicable duty or legal obligation, the
factfinder considers whether or not the defendant breached that duty.
B. Breach
Breach is the stage at which the factfinder decides if the defendant
lived up to his legal obligation. In negligence, if there is a duty, the
duty is to exercise reasonable care and so, when deciding breach, the
jury asks itself whether the defendant exercised reasonable care under
the circumstances. When torts professors teach breach, they dwell
upon which circumstances the factfinder may consider. If there is a
sudden emergency, how much care is reasonable? If the defendant is a
professional, what is the standard of care? If one really thinks about
it, the answers to these questions are legal conclusions, and are therefore part of the duty decision. If the statement about what circumstances the jury should consider goes into the jury instruction, it is a
legal determination and is part of the duty owed by the defendant. The
breach question then is: did the defendant comply with the applicable
standard? Thus, the court states the duty, narrowing or specifying if
the law so provides, and the jury applies the particular facts to that
statement of duty to determine if there was a breach. The comparison
of the facts to the articulated standard of care is the breach analysis.
The jury makes that comparison.
In a case where the court has, as a matter of law, adopted a statute
as the standard of care of a reasonable person under the circumstances, breach can be a very simple matter; 09 the jury only needs to
decide whether the defendant violated the statute. To reiterate whatever the standard of care is or how it is established by the courtbreach involves deciding if the defendant lived up to his legal obligation as defined by the court.
C.

Cause-In-Fact

After duty and breach, the next element of negligence is cause-infact, which, like breach, is a supposedly factual determination for the

108. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Cats or Gardens: Which Metaphor Explains Negligence? Or, Is Simplicity Simpler than Flexibility?, 58 LA. L. REV. 35 (1997) [hereinafter
Galligan, Cats or Gardens]; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence:
Some Ramblings Inspired by Robertson, 57 LA. L. REV. 1119 (1997) [hereinafter Galligan,
Revisiting]; David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among InstitutionalDecision Makers
in Louisiana State-Court Negligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 LA. L. REV. 1079, 1092
(1997) [hereinafter Robertson, Allocating Authority]; David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary
of Negligence Law: Continuing Causation Confusion, 58 LA. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Robertson, Vocabulary of Negligence].
109. See supra note 103.
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jury.110 But there are questions of legal obligation lurking behind the
cause-in-fact inquiry. The court's legal hand is ubiquitous; there are legal determinations involved in cause-in-fact which ultimately shape the
nature and extent of the total legal obligation. The basic articulation of
the "but for" test for cause-in-fact is a legal statement. NAhen the court
uses an alternative test for cause-in-fact in cases where the plaintiff cannot prove "but for" causation, it is expanding the defendant's liabilityit is expanding the defendant's duty or obligation.
The traditional test for determining cause-in-fact is the "but for"
test."' When the factfinder can say that it is more likely than not that
"but for" the defendant's particular alleged act of negligence the plaintiff would not have suffered the particular injuries for which she sues,
the defendant's act was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injuries. The
"but for test" itself is a legal statement. The law provides that a "but
for" cause is sufficient to establish cause-in-fact. The law could be different. Any cause that had "something to do with" 1 1 2 the plaintiffs injury could be sufficient. Or, any act of defendant that enhanced the
chance plaintiff would be injured could be sufficient.1 1 3 Generally,
courts do not use such language and adhere to the "but for" test. The
plaintiff must prove "but for" causation because the law-the courtsays so. The defendant's responsibility in negligence encompasses injuries that would not have occurred but for her negligence.
There are some cases where the "but for" test does not establish
cause-in-fact; however, the court allows the case to proceed anyway; in
other words, the court relaxes or adjusts the cause-in-fact test. In essence, the court extends the defendant's legal obligation by relaxing the
plaintiffs burden of proving cause-in-fact. The law decides that even
though the plaintiff cannot establish the defendant was a "but for" cause
of its injuries, the law expands the defendant's legal obligation to protect
the plaintiff from the injuries she suffered. The court might allow the
plaintiff to resort to the substantial factor test, 1 1 4 to use alternative liability," to recover for a lost chance of survival,1 1 6 to rely on market share
liability,1 1 7 or to use another course of action.
When the court does so, it is changing the law; it is making a decision about the defendant's legal obligation. It is saying that even
though plaintiff cannot prove cause-in-fact under the traditional "but

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Or judge as factfinder.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 185.
E.g., Hill y. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1042 (La. 1991).
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 189.
Id. § 193.
Id. § 196.
Id. § 194.
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for" test, the law will still allow the plaintiff to establish liability based
on an alternative causation theory. When the court extends the defendant's liability in that manner, it does so because of some overarching
policy reason. That decision to allow recovery is not really about causation at all but is about refraining the legal obligation; which, as I have
used the idea, is about duty. And, the decision to allow a plaintiff to use
one of those alternative causation theories is always a question for the
court. Again, think of the jury instruction; if it goes into the jury instruction, it is law. Thus, the court continues to shape the legal obligation or
duty, albeit as part of the cause-in-fact inquiry.
One example arises where two forces combine to bring about damage to the plaintiff. The classic example is two fires, either of which
alone would have burned down the plaintiffs home, but which combine
to do so. 11 8 Neither fire is a "but for" cause of the resulting injury because either fire alone would have caused the damage. Without fire A,
the building would have still burnt down because fire B would have
consumed it. Without fire B, the building would have still burnt down
because fire A would have consumed it. The courts have found both
fires to be causes-in-fact of the injury. How so? By changing the legal
test for cause-in-fact. Rather than requiring the plaintiff to establish
"but for" causation, the courts instead require the plaintiff to establish
that the relevant defendant's fire was a "substantial factor" in causing
the injury." 9 By changing the causation test, the court changed the
law. This is a legal matter. The court's announced legal rule is a statement of the scope of the defendant's legal obligation.
A clear example of the shaping of the legal obligation or duty related, on its face, to cause-in-fact1 2 0 occurs in lost chance of survival
cases. 12 1 In those cases, courts that adopt the theory do not change the
"but for" cause-in-fact test; instead, they legally redefine recoverable
damages. In essence, the court concludes that the duty (to exercise reasonable care) includes the risk that a breach of the duty will deprive
the plaintiff of a chance of surviving. 12 2
In a lost chance of survival medical malpractice claim, a health care
provider deprives a plaintiff with less than a fifty percent chance of

118. Anderson v. St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 48 (Minn. 1920).
119. See id.
120. And included in torts casebooks in the chapters on cause-in-fact. See supra note 62
and accompanying text.
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. n (Am. LAW INST. 2005).
122. See, e.g., Pipe v. Hamilton, 56 P.3d 823, 829 (Kan. 2002) (holding that a five percent
to ten percent chance of survival was actionable and not de minimis). The same may be said
if the defendant has increased the risk of the plaintiff suffering some adverse condition or
disease in the future. Joseph H. King, Jr., "Reduction ofLikelihood" Reformulation and Other
Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 502 (1998).
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survival of that chance when the health care provider commits malpractice in treating that underlying condition.123 After the patient dies
from the condition, it cannot be said that but for the defendant's negligence the patient would not have died, because statistically the decedent would have died from the condition anyway. Thus, if the patient's
beneficiaries sue for wrongful death arising from the defendant's negligence, the case would be unsuccessful because the wrongful death
plaintiffs cannot establish cause-in-fact under the "but for" test. However, if the court allows the plaintiff to restate the damages as the loss
of the chance of survival1 2 4 rather than death, the "but for" test works,
and the plaintiff can recover. The "but for" test works because one can
say that but for the malpractice, the decedent would not have lost the
less than fifty percent chance of survival. 1 25 By restating the allowable
recoverable damages-to allow recovery for the lost chance damagesthe court has made it so the plaintiff can establish "but for" causation.
That decision is not factual-it is a legal, policy-based decision. Such
a decision is to say that the health care provider's legal obligation or
duty to the patient includes the obligation to prevent the loss of a
chance of survival. And, if the defendant health care provider deprives
the plaintiff of a chance of survival, those damages are recoverable.
Again, the court is defining the duty or obligation.
In Summers v. Tice, two hunters fired their shotguns at a bird, and
a pellet from one of their guns struck the plaintiff in the eye. 12 6 The
plaintiff could not prove "but for" causation because the available forensics could not determine from which hunter's gun the blinding pellet had come. 1 27 The court still allowed the case to proceed by switching
the burden of proof to the defendants. 128 This switch was a legal decision-it was a decision about responsibility and obligation. Of course,
neither defendant could prove he was not the source of the blinding
shot, resulting in what some call "alternative liability." 1 2 9 The court

123. See, e.g., Smith v. State of La., Dep't of Health and Hosp., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La.
1996).
124. Whether separately valued as a lump sum or valued as the percentage of survival
lost times what would have been recoverable in a wrongful death suit. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST.
2005).
125. If the chance of survival was greater than fifty percent, say eighty-five percent, the
plaintiffs should succeed on the wrongful death action, although the defendant might wonder
why he is not liable for the loss of an eighty-five percent chance of survival rather than the
entire wrongful death.
126. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1948).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4.
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28(b).
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here essentially redefined cause-in-fact under the mantle of a shift in
the burden of proof. 130
In the products liability context, some courts have adopted the theory of market-share liability, where challenges arise for plaintiffs in
determining exactly which of several manufacturers' identical, or
nearly identical, products injured them.1 3 1 In market-share liability
cases, the plaintiff cannot identify the source of the particular drug or
substance which caused her damage, but courts which adopt the theory of market-share liability allow the plaintiff to prove causation and
responsibility based on the defendant's production of the generic product and their participation in the marker. 13 2 In essence, the court is
extending a defendant's duty to a plaintiff for whom there is only a
statistical possibility-often less than fifty percent-that they were affected by a particular defendant's product.
D. Legal Cause
The next element for negligence is legal or proximate cause. It is
the element where the jury decides, based on the common sense of the
community, whether, given all they have seen and heard, the defendant should be liable to the plaintiff. The jury decides if it is just and
fair under the circumstances to impose liability and whether the way
in which the damage ultimately occurred was so bizarre or out of the
ordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible. In
asking the jury to decide legal or proximate cause, we are asking the
jurors to decide based on what Justice Andrews called "practical politics."1 33 We are not asking them to decide based on legal policy, but
rather, we are, or should be, asking them to apply the common sense
of the community.
Traditionally, with proximate cause courts instructed juries to inquire about whether the injury and the way it occurred was foreseeable, natural, probable, direct, or remote. 13 4 Judges also instructed juries about intervening and superseding causes.1 35 The legal realists

130. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 14.9, at 328. In market share liability
cases the plaintiff cannot identify the source of the particular drug or substance which
caused her damage but courts which adopt the theory of market share liability allow the
plaintiff to prove causation and responsibility based on the defendant's production of the
generic product and their participation in the marker. Id. § 14.10, at 330.
131. Sindellv. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).
132. See id.
133. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
134. D.E. Buckner, Comment Note Foreseeabilityas an Element of Negligence and Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2D 942, 945 (1965).
135. See DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, §§ 15.14-15.19, at 361-75.
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thought such words obscured the matter. 136 As such, they made significant contributions by pointing out that much of what the law called
proximate cause was not about causation at all but was a question of
legal policy.1 37 And legal policy is for the judge to decide. The Realists
created the duty/risk 3 8 method of determining what the common law
traditionally called proximate cause. It recognizes that the common
law proximate cause element was often really a decision regarding the
scope of the defendant's duty. The duty/risk method conflates the duty
and proximate cause question into one question: does the defendant's
duty protect against the risk which occurred in this case and the manner in which it occurred? 13 9 The authors of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts seem to agree with this duty/risk or scope of the duty method of
analysis and replace legal cause with a risk analysis under which one
is responsible for those risks which made one negligent in the first
place. 14 0 The specificity with which the court asks the duty/risk or
scope of the risk question, vis-A-vis the particular facts before the
court, as opposed to the general type of risk and general manner of
occurrence, is a subject of some significant debate. 14 1 That subject is
generally beyond the scope of this Article. Although, because this Article claims that legal cause calls for the common sense of the community in the particular case before the court, it necessarily leans towards
more general analyses of duty and scope of duty. 142
E. The Damages
Damages is the element where the jury evaluates, measures, and
quantifies the plaintiffs injuries. 143 That is it. The jury never gets to
damages if it does not conclude that the defendant's act breached the
applicable legal obligation and caused harm. For damages, the jury
136.
(1961).
137.

See e.g., Leon Green, Foreseeabilityin Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401
LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 74-152 (1930).

138. See Leon Green, Duties, Risks, CausationDoctrines, 41 TEx. L. REV. 42 (1962); Leon
Green, The CausalRelation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962).
139. Malone, supra note 18, at 79, 98-99.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
cmts a & b (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
141. See Galligan, Cats or Gardens, supra note 108; Galligan, Revisiting, supranote 108;
David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority, supra note 108; Robertson, Vocabulary of Negligence, supra note 108.
142. Arguably making the legal cause question part of the basic duty question would
make the structure of torts cleaner because all torts do not seem to include this ultimate
fairness inquiry in their elements. I will discuss this reality below.
143. This Article says damages throughout because damages are what plaintiffs usually
seek in torts cases. The paper could just as easily have said remedy because there are occasions where plaintiffs seek injunctions or restitution in torts cases. In a case where a plaintiff
sought damages or injunction, the structure is still applicable albeit with slightly different
remedies.
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adds up the harm the defendant's breach caused. Evaluating, measuring, and deciding quantum is the extent of the damages analysis. The
jury certainly must make difficult decisions in quantifying the plaintiffs harm, but the doctrine should not overstate the legal aspect of
damages.
Everything else-other than evaluation, measuring, and quantifying-that people say about damages in books and cases are really
statements of duty or law. For instance, scholars and courts ask: what
types of damages are recoverable? 144 Should the jury take the non-taxability of personal injuries into account when awarding damages? 1 45
Should the jury reduce to present value? 14 6 Are medical monitoring
damages recoverable? 147 All of these are legal questions about the scope
of the defendant's obligation or responsibility. While torts books generally treat these subjects as damage issues, they are, in essence, decisions about the legal obligation owed; they are duty questions. Three
examples explicate this point: negligent infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death, and loss of consortium.
Whether, and when, the law recognizes recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress is an issue of the defendant's legal obligation,
not an issue of adding up damages. It is a duty issue-the extent of the
recognized legal obligation. It is not an issue of whether the plaintiff
proved she suffered this alleged damage and how much. It is a matter
of the law determining whether or not it will allow that type of recovery at all. Does the duty (to exercise reasonable care) include the risk
that the plaintiff will suffer emotional distress? Naturally, a jurisdiction may determine that only certain people-those in the zone of danger, 14 8 those impacted, 14 9 those exposed to a hazardous substance,15o
those close family members who view an injury-causing event1 '-are
allowed to recover, but that is a determination of duty or obligation; it
is not merely a determination of the extent of injury.
Additionally, casebook authors formerly included wrongful death
discussions in the chapter on damages, or at least near it. 15 2 Again,
who can recover damages they suffer as the result of the death of
another and what those recoverable damages are is a duty question.
144. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, §§ 34.1-34.2, 34.4, at 851-59.
145. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 482.
146. Id. § 482.
147. Id. § 479.
148. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 555 (1994).
149. See id.
150. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 394.
151. Id. § 391.
152. E.g., SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 62, at xv (including wrongful death in a separate
chapter immediately following a chapter on damages); TWERSKI & JAMES, supra note 62, at
xviii-xix; DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE xxi-xxii (2d ed. 2002).
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Recognition of a beneficiary's right to recover for the death of another
is a legal conclusion that the tortfeasor's duty not to injure the decedent includes a duty to someone else-usually a close relative-who
suffered no injury at all but the loss of a loved one. The value of those
damages is a jury question. Does it go in the jury instruction? If it
does, it is coming from the judge and it is law-it is part of the legal
obligation.
The same is true for loss of consortium damages. Casebooks 53 sometimes discuss the subject under damages; however, whether the loved
one1 5 4 of a physical-injury victim may recover for his or her loss of support, society, service, and intimacy with someone whom the defendant
physically injured is an issue of the defendant's legal obligation. When
a court recognizes the loss of consortium claim, it is extending the duty
not to physically injure the direct victim to a third person and saying
the duty not to physically injure A includes a duty not to damage B's
relationship with A.1 55
F. Recap
Recapping before applying the structure to other torts, the grand
structure of tort law based on the elements of negligence is as follows:
1) Duty-What is the legal obligation? Most significantly, here one
sees that many issues included under discussions of breach, causein-fact, legal cause, or damages are really legal questions. They are
really determinations about the scope of the legal obligation which
the defendant owes to the plaintiff. Courts decide duty.
2) Breach-Did the defendant comply with the legal obligation or not?
3) Cause-in-Fact-Was the breach a cause of the plaintiff s injuries
under the legally applicable test (as defined by the court, which is
essentially a duty question)?
4) Legal or Ultimate Cause-Should society impose liability for the
breach or would doing so be unfair, given the common sense of the
community?
5) Damages-Did the plaintiff prove damage and, if so, how much?
The following sections will apply the structure to other torts; in other
words, beyond the realm of negligence itself, beginning with products
liability.156

153. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 62, at xviii-xix; SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 62, at 542;
VETRI ET AL., supra note 152, at 592.
154. The loved one has suffered no physical injury at all.
155. This Article mentioned earlier the recoverability of medical monitoring as a question of legal obligation, not damages, per se. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
156. Of course, I might begin by claiming easy victories, such as pointing out that negli-
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IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY

This Section applies the structure to several types of products liability cases. The claims fit the model, which helps to make clear the
similarities of the products claims to negligence claims, rather than
the differences.
A.

Mismanufacture

The structure of torts set forth herein, based on the elements of
negligence, applies to products liability claims. Beginning with a garden-variety mismanufacture case-a case where the manufacturer allegedly manufactured and sold a product that was defective in composition or construction-the elements fit within the model. Imagine a
car which has a missing screw in the brake assembly. When the driver
pushes on the brake pedal the car does not stop, resulting in a collision
and injury. Driver sues manufacturer. Is manufacturer liable? What
must the plaintiff prove?
In most United States' jurisdictions today, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's product (1) had a construction or composition defect in that it deviated from the manufacturer's plans, specs, and/or
design for the product; (2) the deviation rendered the product unreasonably dangerous; and (3) the deviation caused the plaintiff injury.15 7
The defendant cannot exculpate himself by proving that it exercised
reasonable care in manufacturing the product or even that it exercised
extraordinary care. That is why courts1 8 and commentators'1 9 say that
strict liability is appropriate.
Applying the proposed structure of torts and beginning with duty,
the manufacturer has a duty to make a product that is not unreasonably dangerous due to a manufacturing flaw (or defect), no matter how
much care the manufacturer exercised in manufacturing the product.
That is a statement of law-it is a statement of duty. The legal obligation specifies what the law requires of the manufacturer; it requires a
defect-free product. It does not require the plaintiff to prove that the
manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care. The result is a policybased conclusion that the risk of injury from manufacturing or construction flaws should fall on the manufacturer. The manufacturer
made the product; the manufacturer sold the product; the manufacturer profited from the sale; the manufacturer is in a better position
gent misrepresentation fits the model or that a nuisance arising from the defendant's negligence fits the model. These are easy victories because, in essence, negligent misrepresentation and negligently caused nuisances are essentially plain old negligence claims.
157. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 1.3, at 34 (2d ed. 2008).
158. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1963); West
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 89 (Fla. 1976).
159. OWEN, supra note 157, § 5.1, at 254.
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than the injured victim to guard against the occurrence of the injury;
and the manufacturer is in the superior position to spread the cost of
the injury among a broader population through its pricing mechanism
and insurance.1 6 0

The next element in the proposed structure is breach. As, with negligence, the breach question asks whether the defendant manufacturer
complied with its legal obligation: was the product unreasonably dangerous because of a construction defect? Did the manufacturer comply
with its legal obligation? That's the question of breach. With negligence, the issue is compliance with the legal obligation. Unlike negligence, in a mismanufacture case, due care or the lack thereof is irrelevant, but the jury still must decide if the product was unreasonably
dangerous, as defined by the court.
Turning next to cause-in-fact, plaintiffs in products liability cases
must prove that the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the relevant
product was a cause-in-fact of their injuries. It is as simple as that.
Everything discussed in the negligence section about cause-in-fact
would also apply in a products case. Courts commonly use the "but for"
test in products liability cases.161 Courts also rely upon the "substantial
factor" test where appropriate, 1 62 and market-share liability arose in
products liability cases. 1 63 There is essentially no difference here between negligence and products liability. Again, the court determines
the appropriate cause-in-fact test (which is really part of the legal obligation determination), and the jury applies it.164
The structure next considers legal or proximate cause, which is an
element in a products liability case, as it is in a negligence case.165
Sometimes the proximate cause question involves whether the plaintiffs use of the product was a misuse,16 6 as opposed to a reasonably
160.

See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,

concurring). Cf. JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 103-17 (1994).

161. OWEN, supra note 157, § 1.3, at 39-40.
162. Id. § 1.3, at 40.
163. Id. § 1.3, at 40-41. See also supra PartIII.C.
164. Normally, in a construction defect products liability case, the cause-in-fact test will
be "but for." The question there is, can the jury say by a preponderance of the evidence that
"but for" the mismanufacture the plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred? OWEN, supra
note 157, § 11.2, at 769.
165. Id. §§ 12.1-12.3, at 802.
166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2
cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 2005). The Restatement states as follows:
Product sellers and distributors are not required to foresee and take precautions
against every conceivable mode of use and abuse to which their products might
be put ... . Once the plaintiff establishes that the product was put to a reasonably
foreseeable use, physical risks of injury are generally known or reasonably knowable by experts in the field. It is not unfair to charge a manufacturer with
knowledge of such generally known or knowable risks.
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anticipated use. 1 67 Determining whether the defendant has a legal obligation to build a product that does not injure the plaintiff who misuses it, or who uses it in a way that the manufacturer should not have
foreseen, is a duty question. If reasonable minds could differ on the
outcome in a particular case, it is a jury question.
The damages analysis in a products liability case is no different
than it is in a negligence case. The same types of damages and concerns raised in the discussion on damages in negligence applies in a
products liability case.
B.

Design

The structural model is even more clearly applicable in modern
design cases, which, in many jurisdictions, are essentially negligence
cases. That said, the statement of legal obligation or duty can be a
bit confusing when one considers matters such as whether the plaintiff must establish the existence of a reasonably available alternative
design and the effect of state of the art evidence, but those are mere
incidents of challenging difficulty. 168 They do not alter the basic point
that the five-pronged structure derived from the elements of negligence works in products liability cases. For instance, the Restatement (Third) of Torts-Products Liability, Section 2(b) provides, in
part: "A product is defective in design when foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe." 169 That is a statement of law. It is a statement of duty. How safe does the manufacturer's design of its product have to be? The law provides that decision is made vis-A-vis a reasonable alternative design and the resulting failure to adopt that alternative design. Thus, the legal obligation
provides that a product is unreasonably dangerous in design when

Id.
167. Some states require that the plaintiffs product use is reasonably anticipated, and
that the product was the proximate cause of the injury as separate elements. See, e.g.,
Louisiana Products Liability Act, LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.51-59 (1988). Be that as it may,
they are clearly related. Additionally, one could argue that the issue of product misuse is
a matter for comparative fault, rather than a bar to recover, but that is beyond the current
discussion.
168. See OWEN, supra note 157, §§ 8.5, at 520 (discussing reasonable alternative design);
id. § 10.4, at 706 (detailing an overview of the state-of-the-art defense in product liability
cases).
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2
cmt. d. Several states have adopted this requirement either legislatively or through the
courts. For example, Louisiana codified the requirement of a reasonable alternative design
in section 9:2800.56 of the Louisiana Products Liability Act. Maryland also adopted this approach in Phipps u. GeneralMotors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976) and Volkswagen ofAmerica u. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
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there was a reasonable alternative design;17 0 the adoption of that reasonable alternative design could have reduced the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product, as designed; and the failure to adopt
the alternative design rendered the product, as designed, "not reasonably safe."171 That is the legal obligation.
The breach question then involves the factfinder deciding whether
the plaintiff has presented evidence of a reasonable alternative design 172 and whether the adoption of that reasonable alternative design
could have reduced or avoided the risk of harm. Those decisions are
mixed questions of fact and law based upon the particular case, and
the jury would decide them.
Cause-in-fact is no different than it is in a negligence case, although, as noted, the issue of market-share liability generally arises in
products liability cases 7 3 rather than garden-variety negligence cases.
As noted above, the decision to adopt an alternative test for cause-infact is not a causation decision but a legal decision affecting the scope
of the legal obligation; in other words, duty.
Legal or proximate cause and damages decisions are the same in
design cases as negligence and mismanufacture cases.
V.

ULTRAHAZARDOUS OR ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES

The structure set forth herein also enlightens and applies to liability for engaging in abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activities.
This area of the law is sometimes referred to as absolute liability, 17 4
because one is "responsible" for simply engaging in certain activities
when they cause damage, even though one is exercising the utmost
care and is doing the activity exactly as the activity is supposed to be
done. Supposedly, you do it; you are liable. Under the structure, what
170. How different can the alternative design be before it is a different product? Does a
substantially different product constitute an alternative design? These and other questions
go to narrow or refine the duty analysis in a design case.
171. The feasibility of adopting the alternative design from an economic and technological perspective is relevant to determining if the failure to adopt the alternative design
rendered the product as designed not reasonably safe. See OWEN, supra note 157, § 8.4, at
511-12.
172. The issues of how different the alternative design can be or whether a different
product might count as a reasonable alternative design might technically arise at the breach
"stage," where a defendant objects to the introduction of the plaintiffs alternative design or
does so through a motion in limine (a motion filed outside the presence of the jury to exclude
certain evidence). Even in this context, if the judge decides on admissibility, she is essentially
making both an evidentiary decision on relevance and/or prejudice, but she is also making a
statement about the legal obligation owed. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
173. See also DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 14.10, at 330 (describing the
creation of market share liability to respond to product liability issues). But see OWEN, supra
note 157, § 11.3, at 786.
174. See Liability, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing absolute liability
as liability based on causation alone).
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is the duty or legal obligation? The legal obligation provides that if one
chooses to engage in an ultrahazardous activity, one assumes or accepts liability for the damage caused. As in the mismanufacture case,
the fact that the defendant exercised reasonable or even utmost care
is irrelevant.15
Determining which activities are subject to this type of absolute liability is an issue for the court-a duty question. Whatever test the
court employs-ultrahazardous1 16 or abnormally dangerous 7-it is up
to the court to decide, as a matter of law, whether the activity in which
the defendant is engaged is one for which the law imposes absolute
liability. The Restatements so provide."1 8 Activities which typically expose an actor to absolute liability simply for engaging in them are
blasting," 9 crop dusting, 18 0 and pile driving.1 81 Deciding whether engaging in a certain activity exposes the defendant to absolute liability
is a duty determination.
Breach is remarkably simple in these absolute liability cases. If the
court has decided that the activity is one of the activities for which the
law imposes absolute liability, the breach question is: did the defendant engage in the activity? That is it. In fact, in most absolute liability
cases, breach should not be an issue at all-there would be no question
whether the defendant engaged in the activity, and the parties would
either stipulate to that fact or the court would direct a verdict.
Although duty and breach in absolute liability cases are plaintiff
friendly, the plaintiff must still establish cause-in-fact. 1 8 2 Suppose
Tatiana was admiring her rare Faberge egg that her Great, Great
Aunt Pavlova left her, and she dropped it. Tatiana wailed as she saw
the shattered pieces on the floor. Then, twenty minutes later, her
175.
176.
177.

See, e.g., O'Nealv. Int'l Paper Co., 715 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1983).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h. (AM. LAW INST. 1938).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20
§ 520 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST.

cmt. 1 (Am. LAW INST. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
1965).

178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 20
cmt. 1 ("Whether the activity is abnormally dangerous is determined by the court .... );
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. 1 ("Whether the activity is an abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the court . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520
cmt. h ("What facts are necessary to make an activity ultrahazardous under the rule stated
in this Section is a matter for the judgment of the court.").
179. E.g., M. W. Worley Constr. Co. v. Hungerford, Inc., 210 S.E.2d 161, 163-64 (Va.
1974); see also Spano v. Perini Corp., 250 N.E.2d 31, 33 (N.Y. 1969); Whitman Hotel Corp. v.
Elliott & Watrous Eng'g Co., 79 A.2d 591, 595 (Conn. 1951).
180. See, e.g., Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 833-34 (Okla. 1961); see also Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 316-17 (Or. 1961); Gotreaux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 293, 295 (La. 1957).
181. See, e.g., Vern J. Oja & Assocs. v. Wash. Park Towers, Inc., 569 P.2d 1141, 1143
(Wash. 1977); see also Sachs v. Chiat, 162 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 1968); Caporale v. C. W.
Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 175 A.2d 561, 564 (Conn. 1961).
182. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 445.
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neighbor, Vladimir, suddenly and with no warning began pile driving
to construct his new dock; Tatiana's house shook and shook. Quickly,
she brightened up, called her lawyer, and sued Vladimir for engaging
in an ultrahazardous activity and breaking the egg! Alas, Tatiana
should not count the proceeds of that lawsuit until the eggs are
hatched, because even though Vladimir engaged in an ultrahazardous
activity, that activity was not the cause-in-fact of the broken egg. Ergo,
cause-in-fact is essential to recovery for damages in "activity" strict
liability cases.
Legal cause is as essential in an absolute liability case as it is in a
negligence or products liability case. Courts1 83 and commentators 1 8 4
sometimes say that one is absolutely or strictly liable for everything
that happens once one engages in the defined ultrahazardous activity.
However, even if one engages in an ultrahazardous activity, there are
common sense limits to liability. As with negligence, it is at the legal
or proximate cause stage that the court asks the jury whether it is fair
in the common sense of the community to hold the defendant liable for
the particular injuries which occurred in the particular manner in

which they occurred.

181

For instance, a commonly cited case exemplifying the applicability
of legal cause concepts to absolute liability is the filicide case involving
blasting and minks. 186 The case arose during whelping season-the
time when mother minks give birth. 187 The defendant was engaged in
blasting for construction purposes; presumably, the defendant was exercising due care.1 8 8 Minks are skittish to begin with, and when the
mother minks on plaintiff s mink farm experienced the vibrations from
the blasting, their nervousness increased, and they killed their
young. 189 As sad, tragic, and disturbing as the events may be in themselves from both a psychological and emotional perspective, it also
meant that the farmer lost his mink crop-fewer minks, fewer furs,
fewer coats, and lower profits for those concerned. The farmer sued the
90
blaster.o
In his suit against the blaster to recover for the lost mink
herd, the court refused to allow recovery.' 9 It was just too bizarre.
Holding the defendant liable was beyond what common sense would
allow.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See, e.g., Spano, 250 N.E.2d at 35; Caporale, 175 A.2d at 563.
See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supranote 11, § 79, at 560.
PRODUCT LIABILITY § 7.04 (LexisNexis).
See generally Madsen v. E. Jordan Irrigation Co., 125 P.2d 794 (Utah 1942).
WHELP, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/whelping [https://perma.cc/FA36-5BMP].
Madsen, 125 P.2d at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 195.
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Damages are once again damages. The plaintiff must suffer damages and the plaintiff must prove them. The structure applies; the
structure works.
VI.

DEFAMATION

In defamation cases, the structural model must incorporate the U.S.
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence limiting and defining
tort recovery in state (common) defamation cases. 1 9 2 It is beyond the
scope of this Article to exhaustively analyze the interplay of constitutional and state law that is the law of defamation today.1 93 For present
purposes, it is sufficient to state that the right to recover in a defamation
suit depends upon whether the plaintiff is a public official, 194 a public
figure, 1 or a private figure, and whether the subject of the statement is
a matter of public concern. 196 Also, under state law, the plaintiff must
prove the publication 97 of a false statement of fact198 of and concerning'99
the plaintiff,20 0 and that harms the plaintiffs reputation. 201 The duty of
the speaker ultimately turns on both the constitutional categorizations
and the state law. The next three subsections will analyze the various
constitutional combinations (status of plaintiff and type of speech) under the proffered structure. The analysis will proceed from the most intrusive incursions on state power to the least.

A.

Public Officials and Public Figures

If the plaintiff who is the subject of the defamatory publication is a
public official or a public figure then, constitutionally, the plaintiff cannot recover for defamation under state law unless the plaintiff proves
that the speaker made the statement with actual malice-knowledge
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 558.
See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 1:1-1:12 (5th ed. 2017); see also DOBBS
ETAL., supra note 15, § 517; PROSSERAND KEETON, supra note 11, § 111, at 771. In addition,
for the sake of brevity, I will treat both libel and slander together as defamation. But it
should be noted that the differences between the two involve different legal obligations which
are part of the duty analysis.
194. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
195. See generally Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 28 (1967); Curtis Publfg Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
196. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private figures);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (private figure, and
not a matter of public concern).
197. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 520.
198. Thus, opinion is not actionable. Id. § 37.19, at 996. That is a legal statement, but it
may be up to the factfinder to determine whether the statement was opinion or fact or implied the existence of underlying facts.
199. It would be simpler to say "about" the plaintiff, but the law is not always simple.
200. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 15, § 519.
201. SACK, supra note 193, §2.1.
192.
193.
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of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.2 02 To state the obvious,
that is a statement of the duty or legal obligation. It is a duty shaped
by the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment defamation jurisprudence, but it is a statement of duty nevertheless.
After the court defines the legal obligation, the factfinder will
decide, based on the facts at issue in the particular case, various
factual/breach questions. Did the defendant make the statement?
Was it published? Was it defamatory (was it a statement that would
harm one's reputation in the community)? Did the defendant make
the statement with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth? These are factual questions for the factfinder.
With the cause-in-fact inquiry, the factfinder decides whether
the statement did cause harm to the plaintiffs reputation. That is,
was there actual injury? The jury decides if, assuming there was
harm to plaintiff s reputation, publishing the defamatory statement
brought about that harm.
With defamation and intentional torts, the legal cause analysis
is not always overt. The decision of whether it is fair to impose liability, based on the common sense of the community, has been
shifted to the constitutional analysis briefly set forth above-the
plaintiff must prove actual malice. The scope of liability or case specific legal cause question is generally simple-if the defendant published the statement and the plaintiff satisfies the other elements
of her burden of proof, there is little room for the potentially liability-relieving role of a proximate cause analysis. Perhaps this fact is
also because, at common law, liability for defamation was strict and
harsh. 2 03 Defamation was a strict liability tort. The law decided the
scope of liability for defamation, and it was broad. With the constitutional developments described above, U.S. law is much more
speech friendly, and protection from liability comes from the constitution rather than individual jury determinations about proximate
cause.
Finally, at the damages stage, if the plaintiff has established actual malice, the factfinder places a value upon that injury. Additionally, punitive damages are constitutionally available, and the
precise circumstances in which a jury can award them in a public
official/public figure defamation case depends upon state law, once
again assuming the defendant acted with actual malice.

202. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
203. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK, supra note 45, § 37.2, at 937 ("Truth was no defense; even
to laugh at a libel was a crime."); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 111, at 771-73.
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B. PrivateFigures/Speech Which is a Matter of Public Concern
Alternatively, if the plaintiff is not a public official or public figure
but the speech involves a matter of public concern, the plaintiff can
recover for defamation if she establishes negligent publication of a defamatory statement about the plaintiff that causes actual harm

2 04

to

her reputation. The private plaintiff who sues for defamation in a case
involving a statement of public concern must prove the same things as
the public official/public figure, except the private plaintiff need not
prove that the defendant acted with actual malice. Rather, the private
plaintiff in a case involving speech that is a matter of public concern
must prove that the defendant was at least negligent in making the
statement. 2 05 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the
private plaintiff in a case involving speech that is a matter of public
concern must prove actual injury, 2 0 6 unless the plaintiff establishes the
defendant did, in fact, make the statement with actual malice. 2 07 Then
the court may award presumed damages, a throwback to the days of
strict liability for defamation. That is, the defendant is liable even
though the plaintiff has not established actual injury. Thus, the defendant's duty not to defame a private figure plaintiff, relating to
speech that is a matter of public concern, requires the plaintiff to prove
at least negligence and actual injury. If the plaintiff goes further and
proves actual malice, then the defendant's legal obligation may, depending upon state law, include responsibility for presumed and punitive damages.
At breach, the factfinder determines whether the defendant made
the allegedly defamatory statement; whether the statement was about
the plaintiff; whether the defendant communicated the statement to a
third person; whether the statement tended to harm the plaintiff s reputation; and whether the defendant made the statement negligently
or with actual malice.
At the cause-in-fact stage the factfinder will decide, once again, if
the plaintiff suffered actual injury or whether the defendant made the
statements at issue with actual malice, in which case the plaintiff does
not have to prove actual injury-the state may choose to presume injury occurred. 2 08 Presuming an injury occurred presumes the statement caused the injury.
There is little activity at the legal cause stage in a private plaintiff/speech of public concern case for the reasons set forth in the public
204. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 37.15, at 990.
205. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
206. Id. at 349.
207. Id.
208. At common law, damages in defamation cases were presumed. N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964).
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official/public figure subsection. Finally, at damages, the factfinder
values actual injury if it occurred or awards presumed and possible
punitive damages if the plaintiff established the defendant acted with
actual malice.
C.

Private Figure/PrivateSpeech

If alternatively, the plaintiff is not a public official/public figure and
the speech is not about a matter of public concern, the state has the
maximum power to articulate its own law of defamation, free of constitutional restriction. In this type of case, with a private-figure plaintiff and speech which is not a matter of public concern, the plaintiff
may recover, depending upon state law, if the defendant made the
statement; the statement was about the plaintiff; the defendant communicated the statement to a third person; and the statement was defamatory. Arguably, in such a case, the state may be free to impose
liability without fault. And it is clear that the state may award presumed and even punitive damages. The matters discussed in this paragraph define the relevant duty. At breach in this type of case, the
factfinder makes the key factual determinations.
Cause-in-fact, depending upon state law, may be perfunctory if the
plaintiff chooses not to prove actual injury but instead seeks to recover
only presumed damages. Legal cause is no different in the private/private case than in the other cases; it is resolved as a legal matter and
thus more behind the scenes. The law has once again cast a broad net
of liability once the plaintiff establishes the necessary elements from
a constitutional perspective and state tort law. Finally, the factfinder
values actual injury if the plaintiff proves it and/or awards presumed
damages.
VII.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

Moving from defamation to the other nominate or intentional torts,
the structure still applies. At common law, most of what we call intentional torts 209 arose out of the writ of trespass, with its emphasis on
direct causation. 21 0 Negligence arose later out of the writ of trespass on
the case. 2 11 Historically, then, the development of many, indeed, most
of the intentional torts one studies in law school predate the modern
development of negligence, which is the basis for the articulated structure. To that extent, applying the model to intentional torts may be
somewhat artificial. However, the trespass versus case historical reality in common law is not present in the civil law. Consequently, if the
209. Conversion is the exception. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, §§ 6, 15, at
30, 89 (" [C]onversion had its real genesis in the old common law action of trover.").
210. Id. § 6, at 29.
211. Id.

2019]

THE STR UCTURE OF TORTS

523

model is truly comprehensive, it should apply to intentional torts. In
this Section, the application of the structure to intentional torts is
shown through its application to battery, although the structure would
apply to all intentional torts.
Battery is the intentional infliction of "[a] harmful or offensive contact" with the person of another.212 What is the duty? What is the legal
obligation or rule? It is to not intentionally inflict a contact with the
person of another which is harmful or offensive to a reasonable person.
The definition of battery is the law. It is the duty. It is a legal obligation
just as much as the duty to exercise reasonable care, the duty not to
make unreasonably dangerous products, or the duty not to engage in
an ultrahazardous activity are legal obligations. What is intent, and
how does the law define it? Again, that is a legal definition of a part of
the duty or obligation, so it is a question for the court. What is a harmful or offensive contact? Again, defining harmful or offensive is part of
a duty question for the court. It is a statement of law. Of course, if the
contact would not be harmful or offensive to a reasonable person but
is harmful or offensive to the plaintiff because of some peculiar sensibilities of which the defendant is aware, then the law holds the defendant liable. This too is a statement of law about the legal obligation
owed. The law is recognizing the particular sensibilities of the plaintiff
in defining the extent of the obligation owed.
In deciding if the defendant breached his duty not to batter, as defined above, the factfinder determines whether the defendant did or did
not comply with the applicable legal obligation. That decision would
turn on the answers to several factual questions: did the defendant have
intent? Was the contact with the person of another? Was the contact
harmful or offensive? These are compliance questions, and, as such, they
are breach questions. Cause-in-fact is often quite simple. Did the intended contact occur? Did the defendant with intent to cause a contact
that is harmful and offensive bring about that contact?
As in defamation, there seems to be a muted, or more behind-thescenes role, for case-specific proximate cause decisions. This may be
because with the common law of intentional torts arising from the writ
of trespass, the writ required direct cause, so there was less need for
an additional cause analysis. Notably, some of the rules dealing with
transferred intent resemble legal cause or duty issues. If Z intends to
hit A, but hits B, Z has battered B; the duty extends to her.21 3 Since
transferred intent applies in such cases as a matter of law, the doctrine
212. Id. § 9, at 39. One might be more precise and say that it is the intentional infliction
of a contact with the person of another which is harmful or offensive to a reasonable person,
but either way we are okay. For purposes of this analysis, I am treating consent as a defense-which defendant must prove-instead of treating lack of consent as an element,
which the plaintiff must prove.
213. See, e.g., Morrow v. Flores, 225 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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is truly a duty doctrine. The duty not to batter one person extends to
an unintended battery on another, 2 14 or put differently, the scope of
liability extends to protect the unintended victim if there is an intended victim. It is often said that the scope of liability resulting from
an intentional wrong is broader or more far-reaching because of the
defendant's scienter. 21 5 The extended liability of a trespasser for what
the law calls continuing trespass is another example. 2 16 Whenever the
liability is cut off in a particular case, as it sometimes is because of
bizarreness, that is a legal cause decision.
Another aspect of the liability extending principle which applies in
intentional tort cases and also applies in all personal injury cases is
the thin skull rule. The victim with peculiar sensibilities recovers all
of her damages, even if unforeseeable, if what the defendant did would
have been an actionable tort for the reasonable person. 21 7 This is a matter of the extent of the legal obligation or duty. The duty extends to
protect the thin skull plaintiff against what were unforeseeable injuries caused by the physical impact for which the defendant is responsible. Of course, the thin skull rule applies in all tort cases.
Damages are often presumed in intentional tort cases. Most torts
teachers begin their discussion of negligence, after having started off
the torts course with intentional torts, and say, "now in negligence the
plaintiff has to prove damage and that makes negligence different
than the intentional torts." That is an overstatement. It is true that
with negligence the plaintiff must prove an injury to a protected interest. Is that to say that with intentional torts the plaintiff does not have
to prove an injury to a protected interest or that the plaintiff does not
suffer an injury to a legally protected interest? Not necessarily.
If Popeye intentionally hits Bluto in the face, 2 18 and Bluto suffers a
broken nose, a broken jaw, cannot work for two months, and suffers
terrible pain, Bluto has suffered injury to his legal interests, and he
may recover. Alternatively, if Popeye hits Bluto and he suffers no injury other than just being hit, the law still allows him to recover. Thus,
there is a difference between negligence and intentional torts. If Popeye negligently impacts Bluto's person and causes absolutely no injury
to Bluto, he cannot recover.
However, the absence of physical injury or property damage in the
Bluto battery example does not mean that Bluto suffered no injury. In
214. Indeed, intent transfers amongst all of the intentional torts which arose out of the
writ of trespass. Intent thus transfers from one person to another, one tort to another, and
one tort to one person to a different tort to another. Id. § 8, at 37.
215. See generally Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. 1987).
216. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 13, at 83.
217. Pitrev. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988); Caudle, 512 So. 2d
at 392; Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
218. Assume Popeye has no defenses.
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battery cases, the law presumes that an intentionally inflicted harmful
or offensive contact with the person of another always causes some injury and the plaintiff just does not have to prove it. It is an injury to
honor; it is an injury to the plaintiffs dignity. The existence of damage,
if not the amount, is conclusively presumed. That presumption is really
a statement of the legal obligation or duty. Historically, allowing recovery of presumed damages in battery cases provided an incentive to
plaintiffs to seek legal redress rather than take the law into their own
hands and escalate matters. Given the volatile times in which we live,
it seems the historical justification may still justify the rule.
Interestingly, the damages discussion above raises some salient observations regarding cause-in-fact. Outside the area of intentional
torts (and some remaining pockets of defamation), the plaintiff must
show on a case-by-case basis that but for the defendant's noncompliance with the applicable legal obligation, the plaintiff would not have
suffered the particular damages for which it seeks recovery. With battery and other intentional torts, when only a dignitary injury is involved the damage is presumed. Thus, but for causation is conclusively
presumed. 21 9 The contact caused injury as a matter of law, so there is
no need for further discussion or to confuse the jury by instructing on
it, assuming there is no question that the contact occurred.
However, the analysis is different if the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages beyond dignitary injury resulting from the battery, other
than the contact itself. That is, in my previous example with the broken nose, the broken jaw, the lost work, and the pain, the plaintiff
should have to prove that the intentional contact brought about those
injuries.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The previous several sections have applied the proposed structure
to a variety of tort claims, other than negligence. They have established that the structure applies to and helps bring an analytical consistency to the torts discussed. In some areas, like defamation and intentional torts, the legal cause analysis may be less extensive or apparent than in other torts, but all of the elements of the structure apply to every tort. Moreover, applying the structure makes manifest
that many issues that the law and scholars treat under breach, causein-fact, legal cause, and damages are legal questions, not factual questions. For instance, the definition of the standard of care, the definition
of an unreasonably dangerous product, or the obligation a speaker

219. The same is true in a defamation case where the Constitution allows a state to
award presumed damages. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
763 (1985).
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owes to a public official are not breach questions; they are legal questions. Moreover, by way of example, allowing recovery of lost chance
of survival is not a causation decision; it is a redefinition of recoverable damages, and hence a legal question. As the Legal Realists
pointed out, many so-called proximate cause questions are really legal and policy questions about the scope of the defendant's legal obligation. Not unlike lost chance of survival in cause-in-fact, recovery
for wrongful death or for loss of consortium are not about damages
per se; they are about whether the defendant's legal obligation makes
it responsible for those losses to those plaintiffs. Because they are
legal matters about the defendant's legal obligation, they are ultimately duty questions.
In conclusion, there is a unified structural model of torts which essentially mirrors the elements of negligence-duty, breach, cause-infact, legal cause, and damages. The model, if clearly understood and
articulated by courts and commentators, would bring clarity to the
law. It would bring greater coherence and would go a long way in aiding lawyers and judges to consistently allocate decisionmaking responsibility between judges and juries. Finally, the proposed structural
model brings unity to an area of the law in which many judges, lawyers, law professors, and students view as a potpourri of history, common law development, and social policy. The structural unity the
model brings would force courts, lawyers, scholars, and reformers to
focus on the real social and legal issues that underlie tort suits, rather
than miring themselves in what may now appear to be a mishmash of
claims whose commonality is that they all fall under the rubric of what
we call torts. Finally, the model might help those trying to learn and
understand the law to focus on what really matters-the core substance-instead of a twisting, turning labyrinth of confused concepts
controlled by mythic beasts.

